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Sovereign Debt Documentation: Unraveling the
Pari Passu Mystery
Umakanth Varottil*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Debt Restructuring; the Holdout Problem
When a debtor defaults on its payment obligations to creditors, a
collective action problem generally results. The problem is accentu-
ated when the debtor is confronted by a large group of creditors with
differing interests. In such instances, a serious rift among the creditors
often exists. One group of creditors, known as the participating credi-
tors, tries to work with the debtor to reorganize its debts so the credi-
tors can be confident about recovering at least a portion, if not all, of
the debts owed to them by the debtor.' However, other creditors,
known as holdouts or "vultures," 2 generally believe they will have a
better chance of receiving the entire payment due to them if they
press for it instead of negotiating with the debtor.3 While participating
creditors adopt a negotiation strategy and work with the debtor to
* PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore; B.A., LL.B (Hons.),
National Law School of India University; LL.M, New York University School of Law. I am
grateful to Tan Lay Hong, Tracey Evans Chan, and Hans Tjio for their comments on a previous
draft of this article, and to the staff at the DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal for their
meticulous editorial efforts. Errors and omissions remain mine alone.
1. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 59, 60 (2000); Hyun Chul Lee, Efficient and Inefficient Debt Restructuring: A Compara-
tive Analysis of Voting Rules in Workouts, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 661, 668 (2007).
2. See John C. Coffee Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Con-
strained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1214
(1991). Such creditors are also known as mavericks. See Samuel E. Goldman, Mavericks in the
Market: The Emerging Problem of Hold-Outs in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 5 UCLA J. INT'L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 159, 165 (2000).
3. See Coffee & Klein, supra note 2, at 1214. These creditors usually buy debts of issuers who
are in financial distress, which they do so from other debt investors in the secondary market
rather than in primary issuances. Id. Due to the deteriorating financial position of the issuers,
holdout creditors are able to purchase the debts at a substantial discount to the issue price. Id.
However, upon purchase of these debts, they acquire the right and entitlement to the full value
of the debts (in the form of principal amounts and unpaid interest) against the issuer. Id. Hold-
outs therefore have necessary incentives to stay out of any debt restructuring to press for full
payment or at least to demand a substantially better deal than what is being offered to the
participating creditors in the hope of making a handsome profit in a relatively short time span.
See id.
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optimize their returns in the given circumstances, holdout creditors
adopt a more aggressive strategy, staying outside any restructuring
process, hoping to press their claims in court and force the debtor to
pay the amounts due to them. 4 Holdout creditors' efforts occasionally
succeed. 5
This dynamic holds true even when the debtor is a sovereign. 6 Re-
structuring sovereign debts is fraught with delicate imbalances which
threaten successful workouts and turnarounds. 7 In this situation,
holdout creditors have resorted to clutching at every straw to tip the
scales in their favor. One such straw is the ubiquitous pari passu
clause, a standard term in most debtor-creditor agreements. Pari
passu, a Latin phrase, means "in equal step" or "equally."'8
What is the relevance of the pari passu clause to holdout creditors?
The answer is best examined in the context of a holdout episode that
occurred in relation to debts owed by the Republic of Peru (Peru).
B. The Elliott Case
Banco de la Nacion (Nacion), a Peruvian public sector bank, issued
bonds in the international markets, guaranteed by Peru's govern-
ment.9 Due to a default on the bonds, Peru was forced to negotiate a
restructuring of the bonds with its creditors.10 Around the same time,
Elliott Associates, L.P. (Elliott), a vulture fund, purchased bonds is-
sued by Nacion from certain bondholders." Like any vulture fund,
Elliott refused to participate in the restructuring process.12 Conse-
quently, Elliott adopted an aggressive litigation strategy, sued Nacion
4. Id.
5. A classic litigation strategy is one that was adopted by Elliott Associates, LP, a well-known
vulture fund, against the Republic of Peru and Banco de la Nacion, a Peruvian public sector
bank. See infra Part I.B.
6. Matters get somewhat complicated in the case of a sovereign debtor due to the diverse
nature of its creditors that may include banks, international financial institutions, official bilat-
eral creditors, trade creditors and bondholders; add to that the absence of a bankruptcy or insol-
vency regime that governs delinquency of sovereigns. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile,
Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J.
1043, 1044 (2004).
7. Id. at 1070-71 (discussing the heterogeneity of interests among sovereign bond investors).
8. Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments,
53 EMORY L.J. 869, 871 (2004) [hereinafter The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments]
(reproducing a typical formulation of the pari passu clause in a modern cross-border credit in-
strument: "Itihe Notes rank, and will rank, pari passu in right of payment with all other present
and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness of the Issuer.").
9. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Republic of Peru, 12 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), rev'd, 194
F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999).
10. Id. at 334-35.
11. Id. at 332.
12. Id. at 335.
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and Peru for full payment and obtained a judgment for over fifty-five
million dollars in the district court for the Southern District of New
York. 13 Despite the favorable outcome, Elliott faced a problem com-
mon to sovereign creditors-the inability to enforce judgments in an
effective manner. Sovereigns rarely have assets situated outside their
jurisdiction, making it cumbersome for creditors to recover meaning-
ful judgments.14 The pari passu clause redeemed Elliott from this
weak position.15
Elliott knew Peru was prepared to pay participating creditors (to
the exclusion of the holdouts) under its restructuring, which involved
transferring funds from Peru to the Euroclear System in Belgium,
which would in turn be paid over to the participating creditors.16 Elli-
ott initiated an action in Belgium to enjoin the Euroclear System (act-
ing through its operator and cash correspondent) from processing any
payments received from Peru. Elliott adopted the position that the
payments by Peru violated the equal treatment principle laid down in
the pari passu clause contained in the relevant agreements executed
by Peru.17 An affidavit from Andreas Lowenfeld, a professor at the
New York University School of Law, opined that under the pari passu
clause in the lending document, a debtor, including a sovereign, must
pay all creditors ratably when it makes a payment to any of the credi-
tors. 18 On this basis, the pari passu clause requires debtors to make
payments to creditors on a proportionate basis; debtors cannot make
13. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco De La Nacion, No. 96 Civ. 7916 RWS, 2000 WL 1449862, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000). At the first instance, the District Court, dismissed Elliott's suit on
the ground that it violated the champerty law in section 489 of the New York Judiciary Law. 12
F. Supp. 2d 328. However, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Second District re-
versed the District Court's judgment and remanded the case. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la
Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999). Upon remand, the District Court granted judgment in favor
of Elliott. Elliott Assocs., L.P, 2000 WL 1449862.
14. See G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 Bus. LAw 635, 635 (2001)
[hereinafter Sovereign Piracy].
15. Peru agreed to a pari passu clause in its bond documentation that provided: "[tihe obliga-
tions of the Guarantor hereunder do rank and will rank at least pari passu in priority of payment
with all other External Indebtedness of the Guarantor, and interest thereon." William W. Brat-
ton, Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign's Rational Choices, 53 EMORY L.J. 823, 824 (2004).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, supra note 8, at 878. Professor
Lowenfeld stated in his affidavit:
I have no difficulty in understanding what the pari passu clause means: it means what it
says - a given debt will rank equally with other debt of the borrower, whether that
borrower is an individual, a company or a sovereign state. A borrower from Tom, Dick,
and Harry can't say "I will pay Tom and Dick in full, and if there is anything left over
I'll pay Harry." If there is not enough money to go around, the borrower faced with a
pari passu provision must pay all three of them on the same basis ....
2008]
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payments to some creditors to the exclusion of others. 19 Reversing the
Commercial Court, the Belgian Court of Appeals accepted Elliott's
interpretation of the pari passu clause and granted the ex parte motion
to block Peru's payment on bonds to other creditors.20 Prevented
from paying its creditors to make the restructuring successful, Peru
found itself in a tactically disadvantageous position and settled with
Elliott.21
The court's unconventional interpretation of the pari passu clause
surprised the sovereign debt market.22 Several commentators decried
the Belgian court's interpretation of the pari passu clause. 23 The suc-
cess led other holdout creditors to invoke the pari passu clause to pre-
vent payments by sovereign debtors to participating creditors.24 Thus,
the pari passu clause became a powerful litigation strategy for holdout
creditors to force sovereign debtors to make substantial payments to
holdout creditors. The clause also became a significant impediment to
the successful implementation of workouts between sovereign debtors
and their creditors.
C. Elliott's After-effects
Following the Elliott judgment in 2000 (hereinafter Elliott), practi-
tioners anticipated reactive positioning from sovereign debtors as well
as creditors to neutralize the effects of the pari passu clause in light of
the meaning provided by the Belgian court. Once the implications of
the pari passu clause were assimilated by the creditor community after
Elliott, sovereign debt documentation should have changed, particu-
larly the pari passu clause, to avoid the implications of the judgment.
In other words, the creditor community and the lawyers representing
19. This is a somewhat radical interpretation as the expression "pari passu" was convention-
ally understood to apply only to equality in "ranking" of a debt with other debts and not to the
requirement that all debtors be paid at the same time, without one or more creditors being paid
to the exclusion of others.
20. Bratton, supra note 15, at 824. Elliott initially filed an ex parte motion with the President
of the Commercial Court in Brussels seeking to enjoin the Euroclear System from making pay-
ment to Peru's creditors under the restructuring. The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instru-
ments, supra note 8, at 877. However, as the Commercial Court denied the motion, Elliott
preferred an ex parte appeal to the Court of Appeals in Brussels. Id.
21. Id. at 879.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See generally The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, supra note 8; Bratton,
supra note 15; Sovereign Piracy, supra note 14.
24. The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, supra note 8, at 880-82. Although
the use of the pari passu clause by holdout creditors was not successful in all cases, they were at
least able to force a settlement in some. See Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart, 53
EMORY L.J. 1115, 1133-34 (2004) [hereinafter Building a Better Seating Chart]; see also infra
notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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them were expected to modify the pari passu clause to constrain the
powers of maverick creditors (such as vulture funds) and prevent
them from succeeding in holdout litigation under the Belgian court's
interpretation.
However, this anticipated drafting change never occurred. Empiri-
cal evidence reveals sovereign borrowers continue to operate with the
identical pari passu clause used before Elliott, and failed to internalize
the impact of the Belgian court's interpretation. 25 This poses an inter-
esting question as to whether the continued use ("stickiness") of the
standard pari passu clause is the result of a conscious, deliberate
choice by parties, inadvertence, or fear of changing boilerplate terms.
This episode illustrates that stickiness in contracts following an uncon-
ventional interpretation typically occurs not only among parties whose
bargaining powers are unequal,26 but also in contracts between sophis-
ticated players (advised by specialists in established law firms and/or
investment banks) whose bargaining powers are comparable.
Theories of standard contracts suggest boilerplate terms exist in
contracts due to learning and network benefits, although such terms
may have a value-reducing effect. 27 The pari passu clause as a stan-
25. See generally, Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REv.
1129, 1134-38 (2006) [hereinafter Contract as Statute] (reporting that among 250 sovereign debt
contracts for over 30 countries they reviewed, every single contract had a pari passu clause in it,
and as of September 2005 they are aware of no serious attempt to coordinate a clarification of
the pari passu clause in the drafting of the contracts); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, The
Evolution of Boilerplate Contracts: Evidence from the Sovereign Debt Market, RESTRUcTURING
AND SOVEREIGN BANKR., February 18, 2005, http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/workshops/0405/
gulati.pdf [hereinafter The Evolution of Boilerplate Contracts]; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gu-
lati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EM-
ORY" L.J. 929 (2004) [hereinafter Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts].
26. Contracts where the bargaining power of parties is unequal include (by way of illustration)
those between employers and employees and between banks and retail loan borrowers. In such
type of contracts, the terms are unilaterally set by one party and offered to the other party who is
required to either accept the terms on an "as-is" basis or to reject the entire contract. David S.
Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims
in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33, 56 (noting that such contracts, re-
ferred to as 'adherent' contracts "typically arise in a setting in which a class of stronger parties
has systemically taken undue advantage of the adherent class, either through one-sided contract
terms or through practices that cannot be altered by bargaining between the parties due to the
disparities in power, knowledge, and interests").
27. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Con-
tracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 718 (1997) ("The private bene-
fits to a firm of adopting a standard contract term can be divided into two conceptual categories,
each with different implications. One set of benefits, which we call "learning benefits," arises
when a firm adopts a contract term that has been commonly used in the past, regardless of
whether other firms will continue using it in the future. A second set of benefits, which we call
"network effects," arises when a firm adopts a term that will be part of the firm's contract at the
same time that it is part of many other firms' contracts, regardless of whether it has been com-
monly used in the past.").
20081
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dard term validates these theories because "interpretive shocks" de-
livered by courts28 have failed to propel parties into action to alter this
boilerplate term. 29 Although Elliott caused considerable ambiguity as
to the scope and extent of the pari passu clause, parties are reluctant
to alter the clause for fear of exacerbating the ambiguity and confu-
sion surrounding it.30
This article builds upon the theories of boilerplate terms in con-
tracts and the empirical evidence regarding use of the pari passu
clause to proffer reasons due to which the clause may not have been
altered despite interpretive shocks making it value-reducing to sover-
eign debtors and participating creditors. Several endogenous 31 and ex-
ogenous 32 reasons explain why boilerplate terms may be left
untouched by contract drafters although logic and reasoning dictate
they be altered to cushion interpretive shocks. Existing studies on
boilerplate terms like the pari passu clause focus primarily on endoge-
nous reasons for maintaining the status quo in boilerplate terms.33
However, these studies did not look beyond empirical evidence for
the rationale behind the pari passu clause and similar boilerplate
terms' stickiness or at the exogenous factors playing a crucial role in
the failure to change such boilerplate terms.34 This article fills this re-
search gap by looking beyond empirical evidence and examining exog-
enous reasons for the continued use of the unchanged pari passu
clause despite holdout creditors' successful use of the clause to chal-
28. Following Elliott, in May 2001, Red Mountain Finance, a judgment creditor of the Repub-
lic of Congo obtained an order from a federal district court judge in California enjoining the
sovereign debtor from making payments on its indebtedness without making a 'proportionate'
payment to Red Mountain Finance. See Transcript of Proceedings at *1, Red Mountain Fin., Inc.
v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22324 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2000) (No. CV 00-0164 R)
(judgment). This forced a settlement of the dispute. In another case, the trial court in Belgium
granted LNC Investments an injunction against Euroclear from processing payments on bonds
issued by Nicaragua on the basis of the pari passu clause. See The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign
Debt Instruments, supra note 8, at 880-82; Building a Better Seating Chart, supra note 24, at 1133.
29. See Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts, supra note 25, at 989-92 (use of the expression
"interpretive shocks" in the context of the pari passu clause).
30. The Evolution of Boilerplate Contracts, supra note 25, at 12.
31. For purposes of this article, endogenous reasons or endogenous factors are those con-
nected directly with the clause in question. For a discussion of endogenous factors affecting the
pari passu clause in the context of sovereign debt restructuring, see infra Part IV.
32. Exogenous reasons or exogenous factors are those that are not connected with the clause
in question. These may include other clauses or groups of clauses in the same contract of which
the clause in question is a part, or may include factors such as bargaining power or negotiating
leverage between parties, market conditions or other factors that may have an impact on the
manner in which parties are likely to act in relation to the contract. For a discussion of exoge-
nous reasons pertaining to the pari passu clause, see infra Part V.
33. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
34. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
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lenge sovereign debt restructurings. Using the example of the pari
passu clause and the impact (or lack thereof) following interpretive
shocks provided by court rulings, this article attempts to supply a
framework for understanding the stickiness of boilerplate terms
through a study of both endogenous and exogenous factors.
For ease of logical analysis, this article asserts a series of proposi-
tions which will be affirmed or denied. Part II studies the various in-
terpretations of the pari passu clause after Elliott and attempts to
determine the current substantive law.35 Part III reviews the market
reaction following the interpretive shock Elliott delivered. 36 Part IV
examines the endogenous reasoning for maintaining the unchanged
pari passu clause following the interpretive shock,37 and Part V exam-
ines the exogenous factors.38 Part VI contains normative, forward-
looking observations, 39 and Part VII briefly concludes.
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE PARI PASSU CLAUSE
Proposition 1 (Interpretive Proposition): The Belgian court's inter-
pretation of the pari passu clause in Elliott requiring ratable pay-
ments to all creditors is legally valid and in accordance with the
prevalent legal position.
The anticipated market reaction after Elliott-shocks reverberating
in the sovereign debt market-depends on whether the Interpretive
Proposition can be affirmed. If the Interpretive Proposition is af-
firmed, we expect sovereigns, the participating creditors, and their
lawyers to either drop the pari passu clause from sovereign debt docu-
mentation or to clearly identify the circumstances in which it applies
to ensure holdout creditors no longer use the clause to stop payments
to other creditors. If the Interpretive Proposition is denied, meaning
the Belgian court's interpretation is incorrect, parties to sovereign
debt transactions would not substantially modify or drop the clause
from the documentation. Instead, the parties may include clarifying
language to nullify the negative effects of an erroneous court decision
and guard against holdout creditors abusing the clause. Either situa-
tion should cause a change to the pari passu clause, the specifics being
dependent on whether the Interpretive Proposition is affirmed.
The next step is to test the validity of the Interpretive Proposition in
the broad historical context in which the pari passu clause developed.
35. See infra notes 40-60 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 89-130 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
2008]
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Although the pari passu clause is ubiquitous in debtor-creditor agree-
ments, little interpretive authority from prior case law defines the
scope or meaning of the clause. Interestingly, the pari passu clause is
oftbn inserted by drafters of sovereign debt documentation who are
uncertain of its meaning.40
Under these circumstances, Elliott defined the pari passu clause.
The court determined that where a borrower without sufficient funds
to pay its creditors wishes to pay some of its creditors, that borrower
must pay all creditors on a ratable basis without paying some creditors
more than others.41 This is the "ratable payment interpretation" of the
pari passu clause. 42
Elliott caused a furor among creditors, lawyers, and academics in
the sovereign lending community, who argued the Belgian court's in-
terpretation was incorrect and the pari passu clause does not allow an
interpretation preventing a debtor from paying off one of its creditors
without making a ratable payment to all of its creditors.43 Since Elliott
poses a threat to successful sovereign debt restructurings, even certain
governmental authorities and other bodies in the United States have
argued against the ratable payment interpretation of the pari passu
clause. 44
Several arguments against the ratable payment interpretation of the
pari passu clause exist. First, the pari passu clause is about "ranking"
and not about "payment. '45 The clause only prevents the debtor from
incurring obligations that rank legally superior to the debt held by
existing creditors. 46 It does not prevent the debtor from making pay-
ments to certain creditors without making ratable payments to all
40. Lee C. Buchheit, The Pari Passu Sub Specie Aeternitatis, 10 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 11, 11
(1991) [hereinafter The Pari Passu Sub Specie Aeternitatis].
41. See The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, supra note 8, at 878.
42. Id. at 879.
43. See generally Sovereign Piracy, supra note 14; The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt
Instruments, supra note 8; Bratton, supra note 15 (representing a somewhat balanced approach
in critiquing the use of the pari passu clause to force ratable payments to all creditors); FIN.
MKTS. LAW COMM., ISSUE 79 - Pari Passu Clauses: Analysis of the role, use and meaning of pari
passu clauses in sovereign debt obligations as a matter of English law (2005), http://www.
fmlc.org/papers/fmlc79mar-2005.pdf. [hereinafter FIN. MKTS. LAW COMM.].
44. The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, supra note 8, at 920-21; Contract as
Statute, supra note 25, at 1138. In different cases involving the restructuring of debts of Argen-
tina, the New York Clearing House Association L.L.C., the U.S. Government, and the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York filed amicus curiae briefs and statements of interest challenging the
ratable payment interpretation of the pari passu clause. Id.
45. See The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, supra note 8, at 872.
46. Id.
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creditors. 47 Second, the pari passu clause ought not to be confused
with the timing of payment to unsecured creditors, as that would de-
pend upon the contractual maturity of the debt.48 If the ratable pay-
ment interpretation is accepted, all creditors would need to be paid
simultaneously even if some creditors are not yet due to be paid in
accordance with the terms of their contract.
Third, in the corporate debt context, the practical consequence of
the clause is most relevant during a bankruptcy or liquidation.49 How-
ever, unlike a corporate debtor, a sovereign cannot become bankrupt
or be liquidated,50 and hence the pari passu clause in a sovereign debt
obligation must have a different purpose. That leads to the fourth ar-
gument, as noted by the Financial Markets Law Committee in the
United Kingdom:
[T]he only purpose of the clause was believed to be to prevent sov-
ereigns from "earmarking" revenues of the government or allocat-
ing foreign currency reserves to a single creditor or, more generally,
to prevent the sovereign from adopting legal measures which have
the effect of preferring one set of creditors against the others. 51
More specifically, Lee Buchheit and Jeremiah Pam, in their detailed
historical account of the pari passu clause, allude to the previous exis-
tence of specific laws in Spain and the Philippines that enabled sover-
eigns to involuntarily subordinate creditors by utilizing certain
prescribed procedures. 52 This system posed a significant risk to the
ranking of sovereign creditors, making the pari passu clause crucial for
the protection of such creditors. 53
Fifth, several creditors have been conferred priority of payment by
convention. The most popular example relates to international finan-
cial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which
demand and receive de facto priority.54 These institutions have always
received repayments on a priority basis over other creditors of sover-
47. See id. at 876; Sovereign Piracy, supra note 14, at 637; Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal
Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 299, 314 (2005); The Pari Passu
Sub Specie Aeternitatis, supra note 40, at 12 (stating that "the existence of a conventional pari
passu undertaking in a loan agreement will have no effect on the sovereign borrower's legal
ability to pay one creditor even if it is then in default on its payment obligations to other
creditors...").
48. Sovereign Piracy, supra note 14, at 645.
49. The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, supra note 8, at 873.
50. Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Ap-
proach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 957-68; Hagan, supra note 47, at 348.
51. FIN. MKWS. LAW COMM., supra note 43, at 7.
52. The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, supra note 8, at 903-04.
53. Id. at 903.
54. See Contract as Statute, supra note 25, at 1135.
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eigns and such priority has traditionally never been questioned.55 The
ratable payments interpretation of the pari passu clause runs counter
to the established priority held by international financial institutions.5 6
Finally, if the ratable payments interpretation is accepted, it would
lead to redundancy in other clauses such as the "sharing" 57 clause.
Parties would not include a sharing clause in contracts if the pari passu
clause was intended to prescribe payment sharing on a ratable basis.5 8
Based on the above arguments, the Belgian court considering Elliott
should not have construed the pari passu clause as a ratable payments
provision.5 9 The overwhelming number of arguments against the judg-
ment in Elliott confirms that the Interpretive Proposition cannot
stand. Owing to the lack of evidence supporting the Interpretive Pro-
position, the market should react by clarifying the language in sover-
eign debt documentation to avoid similar results in the future.60 This
takes us to the next phase of the inquiry to see what, if anything, was
the sovereign debt market's reaction to Elliott.
III. MARKET REACTION TO ELLIO2T
Proposition 2 (Reactive Proposition): In response to the interpretive
shock delivered in Elliott, the markets changed the pari passu clause
to eliminate the negative effects of the shock, thereby neutralizing
the power of holdout creditors and enabling sovereign restructuring
for the larger benefit of participating creditors and sovereign
debtors.
55. Id.
56. Bratton, supra note 15, at 855; FIN. MKTS. LAW COMM., supra note 43, at 14.
57. A sharing clause is one which stipulates that if one creditor receives a disproportionate
payment under the agreement, that payment will be shared ratably with other creditors who are
parties to the sharing arrangement. Lee C. Buchheit, The Sharing Clause as a Litigation Shield, 9
INT'L FIN. L. REv. 15 (1990) [hereinafter The Sharing Clause as a Litigation Shield]. In a general
sense, the sharing clause serves precisely the same purpose as the pari passu clause if interpreted
as a ratable payment clause as in Elliott. Although both the sharing clause and the pari passu
clause achieve the same end-result, there are some specific differences in the operation of each
clause. For instance, the sharing clause tends to impose an obligation on the creditors inter se,
while the pari passu clause also tends to bind the sovereign debtor in addition to the creditors.
See, Lee C. Buchheit, Changing Bond Documentation: The Sharing Clause, 17 INT'L FIN. L. REV.
17, 17-18 (1998) [hereinafter Changing Bond Documentation: The Sharing Clause]; The Pari
Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, supra note 8, at 918.
58. See FIN. MKTS. LAW COMM., supra note 43, at 18; The Pari Passu Sub Specie Aeternitatis,
supra note 40, at 12.
59. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
60. For instance, clarifying language in contracts could potentially be explicit in stating that
the pari passu clause applies only with reference to ranking of debts and not to payment on debts
or timing thereof. This would expressly indicate the intention of the parties that creditors are not
entitled to a ratable portion each time a sovereign debtor makes payments to one or more of its
creditors.
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Before testing the Reactive Proposition, it must be noted that fol-
lowing Elliott, other holdout creditors, refusing to be outdone, began
invoking the pari passu clause to demand payments from sovereigns. 61
Suits were filed in courts in the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Belgium.62 These suits produced varying results-(i) some
holdout creditors prevented payments to other participating creditors;
(ii) some forced the sovereigns to settle; (iii) some failed to get any
relief from the courts; and (iv) others did not secure the court's atten-
tion due to preliminary matters such as the lack of appropriate subject
matter jurisdiction. 63 Nevertheless, the courts never had a subsequent
opportunity to directly address the Belgian court's interpretation of
the pari passu clause in Elliott.64 Therefore, when evaluating the risk
of holdout litigation in sovereign debt restructuring, note that the in-
terpretive shock from Elliott has had a lasting impact and the results
of subsequent suits do not appear to dilute its effects.
That leads to the key question regarding the market's reaction to
Elliott. Although a number of years have elapsed since Elliott, the pari
passu clause in sovereign debt documentation remains unchanged.
Professors Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati studied data for twenty
countries which issued more than ten loan or debt instruments be-
tween 1985 and 2005.65 In their study, Professors Choi and Gulati
identified a dozen versions of the pari passu clause. 66 This article will
consider two versions that represent the extremes: one is a pure rank-
ing clause,67 the other is a strong version of the clause that refers to
payment in addition to ranking.68 The pari passu clause in Italy was
broad enough to fall into the ratable payment interpretation in Elliott.
61. The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, supra note 8, at 880-82.
62. See id. (describing cases invoking the pari passu clause to demand payments from
sovereigns).
63. See id.
64. Contract as Statute, supra note 25, at 1136 ("[m]ore important, the sovereign lawyers have
not been able to get any of the courts in these jurisdictions to adopt their interpretation of the
pari passu clause.").
65. Id. at 1137. In addition to reviewing the contracts entered into during the period, Profes-
sors Choi and Gulati also conducted over fifty in-depth interviews with market participants
which supported the quantitative data that there was no conscious attempt to make any modifi-
cations to the pari passu clause. Id. at 1136-37.
66. Id. at 1136.
67. A pure ranking clause can be found in the Portugal (U.S. law), $2 billion, Registered
Offering, 7/26/05: "The notes will rank pari passu with all other unsecured Indebtedness of the
Issuer." Id. at 1148.
68. A pari passu clause that deals with both ranking and payment can be found in the Italy, $4
billion, Registered Offering, 1/13/05: "They will rank equally with all our present and future
unsecured and unsubordinated general borrowing .... We will pay amounts due on the debt
securities equally and ratably with all general loan obligations of Italy." Id. at 1149.
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Despite the significant legal risks of this position, no change was forth-
coming. 69 The boilerplate analysis of contracts has set the clause in
stone although it poses significant legal risk and uncertainty to the
contracting parties.
The failure to change the pari passu clause may be caused by sev-
eral reasons. First, network effects could prevent changing a boiler-
plate term such as the pari passu clause, which has been consistently
agreed to in financing contracts for several decades and used by mar-
kets across the board.70 Parties may find it costlier to change boiler-
plate terms for a large number of market participants than bear the
risks of uncertainty and ambiguity in a potentially value-reducing boil-
erplate term.71 In essence, parties find change costlier than maintain-
ing the status quo. Second, market participants may consider changing
boilerplate terms to neutralize interpretive shocks too risky because,
even if parties contend the court's interpretation is incorrect, any
change subsequent to an adverse decision (for example in Elliott to
the pari passu clause) amounts to an implicit admission that the
court's interpretation of the clause prior to amendment was correct.72
Third, market participants may provide a coordinated response to an
adverse judicial decision through litigation rather than by changing
boilerplate contract terms.73 Response through litigation was evident
even in the pari passu episode. 74 However, despite these measures,
there was no change to the pari passu clause following Elliott, and
hence the Reactive Proposition stands denied. This leads to an exami-
69. See Contract as Statute, supra note 25, at 1149-50. In fact, in the context of boilerplate
contracts, it is difficult to assume that minor changes to wording of clauses will necessarily make
a difference to legal consequences. This is contrary to popular perception that textual differences
in clauses alter their interpretation generally. See id.
70. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 27, at 718.
71. If only some parties change the clause while others do not, that would exacerbate the
ambiguity and lack of uniformity thereby upsetting a market standard. See Contract as Statute,
supra note 25, at 1138.
72. Id. at 1137.
73. Id. at 1138. The thrust of the litigation strategy as a response to Elliott involved a con-
certed action from various members of the sovereign debt community that filed amicus curiae
briefs in the case involving the Argentine debt restructuring, wherein they opposed the wider
interpretation of the pari passu clause that was offered by the Belgian court in Elliott. Id.
74. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. In addition, several commentators were
critical about the broad interpretation of the pari passu clause in Elliott. See The Pari Passu
Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, supra note 8; Sovereign Piracy, supra note 14. The Finan-
cial Markets Law Committee in England even produced a detailed report on the role, use and
meaning of pari passu clauses in sovereign debt obligations as a matter of English law, which
concluded not only that as a matter of English law the ranking interpretation is the proper inter-
pretation of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt obligations, but that the consequences of the
payment interpretation are such that both debtors and creditors would be prejudiced by such a
construction. FIN. MKTS. LAW COMM., supra note 43, at 22.
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nation of the specific reasons why change may have eluded the pari
passu clause.
IV. ENDOGENOUS REASONING
Proposition 3 (Endogenous Reasoning Proposition): The reasons
why a boilerplate contract term such as the pari passu clause does
not react to interpretive shocks can be found endogenously by look-
ing at the interpretation of the clause itself or other circumstances
directly surrounding operation of the clause. 75
The Endogenous Reasoning Proposition proceeds on the basis that
the reasons a boilerplate contract term will react or remain undis-
turbed following an interpretive shock are found in the clause itself.
These reasons are evident either in an interpretation of the clause by
one or more courts of law or in the way the market's intention has
been evidenced through practice and convention. 76 The Endogenous
Reasoning Proposition does not look beyond the clause and its inter-
pretation (either by courts or through market practice) or the direct
effects of such interpretation on the relative positions of the con-
tracting parties. For instance, an endogenous examination of the inter-
pretive shock produced to the pari passu clause involves a study of the
market's reaction to the clause through either modification of the
clause or appealing to courts to overturn the previous interpretation
to remove the effects of the shock.
As we have seen in the case of the pari passu clause, an endogenous
examination of the term reveals two sets of results: (i) empirical stud-
ies that indicate no change to the pari passu clause following the inter-
pretive shock delivered in Elliott;7 7 and (ii) certain endogenous
reasons beyond empirical studies explain why the pari passu clause
remains unchanged. 78 However, neither set of results provides a con-
clusive answer to the mystery of the pari passu clause's obstinacy de-
spite its exposure to value-reducing risks. This calls for an
examination, with continued assistance from the pari passu example,
of some of the deficiencies of endogenous reasoning for boilerplate
contract terms.
While empirical evidence helps identify the market reaction to a
particular shock relating to a boilerplate contract term, empirical stud-
ies by themselves do not explain the reasoning behind the reaction.
75. For the scope of endogenous reasons for the operation of a boilerplate contract term, see
supra note 31.
76. See Contract as Statute, supra note 25, at 1158-59.
77. See id. at 1136-37.
78. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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Empirical studies report what happened following an interpretive
shock and when it happened, but not the crucial question of why it
happened. 79 Consequently, in the present context, the reason the pari
passu clause did not react to the interpretive shock is as important (if
not more) than whether and how it reacted, if at all.
The arguments favoring the continuance of the pari passu clause
based on endogenous reasoning are unsatisfying. The primary argu-
ment is that network effects prevent change80 and any change result-
ing from an interpretive shock amounts to an implicit admission that
the court properly interpreted the previous clause.81 The validity of
these arguments is unclear. Boilerplate terms are susceptible to
change too, albeit over a period of time. Contract terms experience
market innovation even when those terms are boilerplate.82 If a shock
is too costly to market participants, change eventually occurs. 83 Fur-
ther, parties need not always be wary of amending standard contract
terms on the ground that this might be an implicit admission that the
court's decision is correct. As discussed in the context of the Reactive
Proposition, it is possible parties may change boilerplate language by
providing clarifying language to indicate their disapproval of the
court's interpretation. 84 Therefore, the implicit admission argument
does not hold water.
Another argument explaining the continuance of the pari passu
clause is that parties have adopted a litigation strategy in subsequent
cases to counter interpretive shocks arising from Elliott.85 Anecdotal
evidence culled from cases subsequent to Elliott reveals that although
some sovereign debtors successfully prevented holdout creditors from
enforcing the pari passu clause to ensure ratable payments, no cases
79. See The Evolution of Boilerplate Contracts, supra note 25, at 46 (response by Lee C.
Buccheit).
80. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 27.
81. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
82. See Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts, supra note 25, at 937.
83. An important illustration of change to a boilerplate term relates to a shift from unanimous
action clauses to collective action clauses in New York law governed sovereign bond documents.
In this case, change from unanimous action clauses to collective action clauses following an inter-
pretive shock did not occur immediately, but did so after a gap of a few years. For a discussion of
this change, see infra Part V.A.; Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts, supra note 25, at 933; Anna
Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
1627, 1639 (2006) [hereinafter Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study]; William W.
Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 667, 687
(1984) (dealing with correction to boilerplate language in domestic bond documentation follow-
ing interpretive shocks delivered through a court decision).
84. See supra Part III.
85. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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contradict Elliott.86 Despite the so-called litigation strategy justified by
commentators, 87 Elliott's impact continues to pervade the sovereign
debt markets, and the interpretation could be followed by courts
world-wide as containing precedential value. While the discussion fol-
lowing Elliott convincingly highlights the judgment's deficiencies, the
effects of Elliott remain. 88
Lingering uncertainty over the clause continues in the market. Can
sovereign debt markets with billions of dollars in loans afford to oper-
ate in such ambiguous circumstances? Will participating creditors
worry that payments could be attached or stopped unless holdout
creditors are paid out on a ratable basis? Will international financial
institutions, whose basis of operation relies on priority of payments,
be apprehensive about their inability to obtain priority payments? Are
law firms representing contracting parties willing to vouch for the en-
forceability of the payment clauses despite the broad interpretation
given the pari passu clause? Why then do the markets players not at-
tempt to modify the clause and just abate these difficulties? The En-
dogenous Reasoning Proposition does not answer these questions.
Some other reason or justification must explain why the pari passu
clause remains untouched despite widespread adverse reaction to the
interpretive shock in Elliott. This leads to the next step of exploring
other reasons-beyond interpretation of the clause itself-to explain
the preservation of the status quo.
V. EXOGENOUS REASONING
Proposition 4 (Exogenous Reasoning Proposition): The reasons why
a boilerplate contract term such as the pari passu clause reacts (or
fails to react) to interpretive shocks can be found exogenously by
looking beyond the clause in question to other changes or develop-
ments that alter the relationships and dynamics between the parties
and their strengths and weaknesses relative to each other.
86. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
87. See Coffee & Klein, supra note 2, at 1215-16.
88. It is relevant to highlight one possible view that may seek to justify the obstinacy of the
pari passu clause despite its incorrect interpretation in Elliott. This view is that Elliott is an aber-
ration and is unlikely to be adopted in any of the common jurisdictions such as the United States
or the United Kingdom, whose laws govern sovereign debt documentation. See Contract as Stat-
ute, supra note 25, at 1137 (containing responses from lawyers who were interviewed by the
authors, stating that Elliott was an aberration). However, this is merely a matter of opinion, and
has not received any authoritative support, particularly because the sovereign debt community
has been unable to obtain a ruling from a court either in the United States or the United King-
dom that expressly disfavors the interpretation of the pari passu clause that has been offered in
Elliott.
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This inquiry requires us to approach the issue from a contract nego-
tiations and bargaining standpoint. This approach helps determine the
reasons for inaction with reference to certain boilerplate contractual
terms like the pari passu clause. As a starting point during contract
negotiation, parties prefer deferring to boilerplate terms generally
used in the marketplace. 89 This induces an element of inertia between
contracting parties that prevents them from changing boilerplate lan-
guage. 90 Deviation from standard terms usually occurs only if a term is
costly to market participants. 91 In other words, if status quo is costlier
than change then market participants gravitate towards change. An
interpretive shock delivered by a court is a classic driver of change.
But, as we have seen, interpretive changes do not always impel a
drafting change in a contract.
Why does this phenomenon occur? Here, we need to look beyond
the boilerplate term and its direct implications. Sometimes, exogenous
factors operate to help maintain status quo.9 2 To illustrate this point,
consider a scenario where a boilerplate term is affected by an inter-
pretive shock and logically requires a change. However, exogenous
factors operating simultaneously may dilute the need for change, mak-
ing the change less crucial than it would have been in the absence of
the exogenous factors. Contracting parties, inherently inert as they
are, prefer status quo over change if the benefits arising from the
change are not substantial. The logical reasoning behind interpretive
shocks and the resulting endogenous reasoning followed by the exoge-
nous reasoning is set out below:
89. See Robert B. Ahdieh, "Boilerplate": Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium Article,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1066 (2006). This is relatable to the "network effects" theory in stan-
dard form contracting. See Kahan & Klauser, supra note 27, at 733.
90. The "inertia theory" of contract negotiation propounds that "[p]arties are likely to favor
default terms, in many instances, because these terms are often correlated with inaction (i.e., the
default terms will be operative if the parties do nothing.)" See Russell Korobkin, Inertia and
Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1586 (1998).
91. See Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts, supra note 25, at 945 n.47.
92. The exogenous factors may be either a single factor or a group of individual factors, or
more likely, a mix of factors operating contemporaneously so as to alter the negotiating leverage
and balance between the parties to a contract.
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FIGURE 1. EFFECTS OF INTERPRETIVE SHOCKS ON
BOILERPLATE CONTRACT TERMS
YES
NO
NO
YES
I now test the validity of the Exogenous Reasoning Proposition
through the example of the pari passu clause and its implications on
sovereign debt restructuring following Elliott. Initially, the interpre-
tive shock delivered in Elliott should have induced change. 93 How-
ever, change did not occur.94 Since change did not occur, the
Endogenous Reasoning Proposition was not supported. Therefore, in
order to determine the reason for this, I apply the Exogenous Reason-
ing Proposition. To complete this analysis, one must consider the
other changes occurring in the sovereign debt market during the same
time frame95 and determine if these changes impacted the pari passu
clause directly or indirectly, thereby explaining the maintenance of
the status quo.
93. See supra Part II.
94. See supra Part III.
95. In applying the Exogenous Reasoning Proposition, we need to consider events beyond
any actions directly impacting the pari passu clause. As regards the timeframe itself, for the
purposes of this study, the time period from 2000 to 2005, namely a five-year period following
Elliott has been considered.
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This study identifies two material exogenous factors that occurred
in the aftermath of Elliott, and considers the role they played in the
context of the pari passu clause.
A. Exit Consents: The Shift from Unanimous Action
Clauses to Collective Action Clauses
A significant shift occurred between 2000 and 2003 in collective ac-
tion mechanisms contained in sovereign bond documentation. 96 This
shift had a significant impact on the feasibility of sovereign debt re-
structuring exercises in light of the opposition by holdout creditors.97
Until 2003, sovereign bonds issued under New York law required
unanimous bondholder approval to amend payment terms (mainly the
principal and interest). 98 Such clauses were also known as unanimous
action clauses or UACs. All other terms, being non-payment terms,
could be amended by a simple majority vote of all bondholders. 99 In
light of the high threshold requirement for amending payment terms,
maverick creditors had an incentive to hold out and extract higher
payments because the restructuring could not be given effect if there
was even a single holdout creditor. 100 This effectively stymied a
smooth restructuring of sovereign debt to such an extent that sover-
eign creditors, as well as the official sector, explored various alterna-
tive mechanisms to deal with debt restructuring.10'
Nevertheless, the market adopted a novel method of overcoming
this difficulty. In 2000, Ecuador used exit consents to restructure its
debt through an exchange offer.10 2 The exit consent mechanism bound
96. See Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts, supra note 25, at 956.
97. See id.
98. Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, supra note 1, at 66 [hereinafter Exit Consents
in Sovereign Bond Exchanges]. This is contrary to the position with respect to sovereign bonds
issued under English law, the payment terms of which could be amended by obtaining the ap-
proval of 75% of the bondholders in terms of amount of debt held. Innovation in Boilerplate
Contracts, supra note 25, at 932.
99. Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, supra note 1, at 66.
100. See id.
101. One such mechanism proposed was the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
(SDRM), which was subsequently abandoned. Relevant market players also explored other op-
tions to deal with the situation, including by proposing change in the contract terms to move
from UAC to collective action clauses (CAG). See Hagan, supra note 47, at 318-20.
102. Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts, supra note 25, at 934. This requires explanation of
two terms, viz. exchange offers and exit consents. Exchange offers are offers made by the sover-
eign debtor to restructure its bonds by issuing new bonds (which represent the restructured
debt) in exchange for the old (pre-restructuring) debt held by the creditors. See Exit Consents in
Sovereign Bond Exchanges, supra note 1, at 62. As part of the exchange offer, the sovereign
debtor seeks the consent (exit consent) of the approving bondholders to amend provisions in the
bonds that they are tendering in exchange (the original bonds) in order to render those bonds
less attractive to any bondholder who may want to hold out. See id. at 65-66. Usually, the non-
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the holdout creditors to the restructuring. 10 3 As in the case of the pari
passu clause, there was no change to the UACs resulting from this
interpretive shock.'04 However, change came three years later when
Mexico drafted collective action clauses (CACs) in its sovereign debt
documentation instead of using the prevalent UACs.10 5 Following
Mexico, other sovereign debt documents replaced their UAC clauses
with CAC clauses.' 0 6 This ensured participating creditors with a sev-
enty-five percent majority could restructure debt and bind the holdout
creditors to this restructuring without any remedy whatsoever to
them. 0 7 When this change was introduced in New York law governed
sovereign bond documentation, it tilted the balance in favor of the
participating creditors rather than the holdout creditors, as the
holdout creditors tended to follow the participating creditors that
commanded the requisite majority and generally restructured the
debts.10 8
payment terms are amended as they require only a simple majority vote. See id. at 66. However,
mere amendment to the non-payment terms (such as by delisting the bonds, deleting the pari
passu and other protective clauses) could still make the bonds highly unattractive so as to com-
pel the holdout creditors to participate in the restructuring and exchange offer rather than hold
on to bonds that are worth much less. See id. This turned out to be a unique way of silencing
holdouts. See id. at 66. This method was first followed by Ecuador to restructure its debts in
2000. See Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts, supra note 25, at 941.
103. Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, supra note 1, at 66. In terms of timing, the
use of the exit consent route to overcome holdout creditors began in 2000, the same year that
Elliott was decided. See Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts, supra note 25, at 934. Therefore,
within a span of a few months in the year 2000, while the holdouts emerged victorious through
the Belgian court's interpretation of the pari passu clause, their position was also substantially
diluted on the other hand by the use of exit consents against them by sovereign debtors as well
as the majority concurring creditors. See id. The contemporaneous nature of these two develop-
ments explains the operation of the exogenous factors, as do other exogenous factors, matters
that we shall see later in this Part.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 934-35 (discussing the plausible reasons for the delayed reaction to exit consents by
way of a change from UACs to CACs in sovereign debt documentation); Public Symbol in Pri-
vate Contract: A Case Study, supra note 83, at 1631.
106. Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, supra note 83, at 1641.
107. Id. As an aside, it is also interesting to note that while the approval requirement for
payment terms was reduced from unanimity to 75%, the requirement for amendment of the non-
payment payment terms such as the pari passu clause increased from a simple majority to 75%.
See id.
108. Although the change from UACs to CACs occurred only in 2003 with Mexico's bond
offering, the dynamics between sovereign debtors and participating creditors on the one hand,
and the holdout creditors on the other, began to undergo a change with the implementation of
exit consents that began in 2000 with Ecuador's restructuring. See Innovation in Boilerplate Con-
tracts, supra note 25, at 941. Hence, while the power of the holdout creditors was diluted in 2000
through the unique method of exit consents, such dilution was formalized and bolstered with the
introduction of CAC in 2003.
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B. The Shift from Fiscal Agent to Trustee with
Sole Enforcement Powers
Most sovereign bonds governed by New York law are issued pursu-
ant to a fiscal agency agreement, where the fiscal agent is the agent of
the sovereign issuer rather than of the bondholders. 10 9 In other cases,
bonds are issued pursuant to a trust indenture which contains mark-
edly different provisions from a fiscal agency agreement. 110 The key
difference is that in trust indentures, the trustee is an agent or fiduci-
ary of the bondholders and not the sovereign issuer. 1 ' Until recently,
either under the fiscal agency agreement or a conventional trust in-
denture, the right of an individual bondholder to bring an action
against the sovereign debtor in recovery of its share of principal or
interest that remained unpaid was inviolable.11 2 However, a Grenada
bond offering document issued in 2005 introduced a novel provision,
which did not provide individual enforcement rights to bondhold-
ers.1 13 This set of provisions had two consequences.
All enforcement rights vested only with the trustee and were exer-
cisable solely for the ratable benefit of all bondholders. This pre-
cluded individual bondholders from pressing for claims and
recovering them to the detriment of other bondholders, reducing in-
centives for bondholders to hold out. 114
Individual bondholders were also precluded from initiating actions
for repayment or acceleration unless a demand was made by holders
of at least twenty-five percent of the outstanding amount of the
bonds.11 5 Unless holdouts constituted at least twenty-five percent of
the amount of the bonds, they were powerless to initiate actions
against the sovereign debtor. Therefore, these provisions limited the
powers of holdout creditors to initiate recovery actions. Sharing
clauses and minimum threshold supports for enforcement operated in
a manner similar to the "automatic stay" in the domestic bankruptcy
109. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 6, at 1102.
110. Id. at 1103.
111. Id.
112. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EM-
ORY L.J. 1317, 1331-32 (2002) [hereinafter Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will]; Lee C.
Buchheit & Elizabeth Karpinski, Grenada's Innovations, 20 J. INT'L BANKING L. & REG. 227,
230 (2006) [hereinafter Grenada's Innovations] (stating that this was a feature of the Section
316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 in the United States, and although the Trust Indenture
Act was not applicable to trust indentures of bonds issued by sovereigns and there was no legal
obligation to carry these rights, these provisions were nevertheless retained as a matter of prac-
tice in trust indentures for sovereign bonds).
113. See Grenada's Innovations, supra note 112, at 230.
114. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 6, at 1105.
115. See Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, supra note 112, at 230.
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context,116 so the debt restructuring could be completed successfully
without interference from holdout creditors.
C. Reflecting on the Exogenous Factors
The net impact of the above changes to sovereign bond documenta-
tion1 17 is that the powers of holdout creditors are substantially cur-
tailed. How does this relate to the pari passu clause? Are the two
shifts, (i) one from UACs to CACs (which was preceded more infor-
mally by exit consents) and (ii) the other from fiscal agent to inden-
ture trustee, the exogenous reasons that explain the failure to change
the pari passu clause? This requires further analysis.
As explained, the interpretive shock delivered in Elliott arose from
holdout litigation.118 Despite the interpretive shocks, the clause did
not change and no endogenous reasoning satisfactorily explained the
preservation of the status quo.119 However, when the Exogenous Rea-
soning Proposition is applied, it becomes apparent the interpretive
shock in the pari passu clause occurred simultaneously with two other
changes that altered equations between the parties. This cushioned
the interpretive shock delivered in Elliott; it was no longer relevant. 120
After the changes, holdouts no longer possessed the same power as
when Elliott was decided. The exogenous shifts (exit consents, the
CAC clause, and indenture trustees) have largely shifted the incen-
tives and negotiating positions of holdout creditors relative to the sov-
ereign debtors and participating creditors.121 Holdout creditors cannot
rely on their ability to aggressively bring about legal actions to frus-
trate debt restructuring processes driven largely by participating credi-
tors unless they muster enough support to surpass the necessary
116. The Sharing Clause as a Litigation Shield, supra note 57, at 16 (noting that by forcing a
maverick litigant to share the proceeds with other participants, sovereign borrowers have effec-
tively replicated a protection from disruptive litigation, which in a domestic context, is usually
conveyed by bankruptcy or insolvency laws); Changing Bond Documentation: The Sharing
Clause, supra note 57, at 18 (observing that in a sovereign bond offering, the main reason for
including a sharing clause is to help suppress holdout litigation.). Further, Buchheit noted that:
A true maverick creditor will not much like the presence of a sharing clause in a bond
issue it is about to buy. Mavericks buy debt instruments on the secondary market at
steep discounts from their face value after the borrower gets into financial trouble....
If the terms of a particular bond render it unsuitable for litigation, the maverick is not
likely to buy that bond.
Id.
117. See supra Parts V.A. and V.B.
118. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
120. See supra Parts V.A. and V.B.
121. See id.
2008]
140 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
threshold percentage required to bring a legal action for recovery. 122
Anything short of that threshold considerably weakens the power of
holdouts.123
The prevailing threshold of twenty-five percent of the total debt is a
significant percentage for two reasons.124 In situations where debts are
diffused among many holders, the collective action problem makes
forming coalitions difficult. 125 In addition, in a negotiated restructur-
ing a large number of creditors tend to restructure the debt rather
than persist with legal action if the terms of the restructuring are rea-
sonable. This leaves an arduous (and often unsuccessful) task for the
holdout creditors to fragment the interests within the participating
block.' 26 This caused a large shift in the dynamics of holdout creditors
relative to participating creditors in sovereign debt restructurings.127
In this context, let us now determine the reason for status quo in the
pari passu clause applying both the endogenous and exogenous fac-
tors. Approaching the problem from a sovereign debt drafter's per-
spective, under purely endogenous reasoning 28 there is not enough
evidence to justify a status quo. Hence, the drafter is more inclined to
modify the clause to neutralize the interpretive shock to avoid ambi-
guity in the legal position and mitigate further risks to the contracting
parties. This endeavor ensures holdouts do not have incentives to use
the pari passu clause to assert their rights in a manner hindering sov-
ereign debt restructuring. However, since change did not occur, the
endogenous factors do not offer a sufficient explanation.
Due to exogenous factors (other reasons and shifts in boilerplate
language discussed earlier), the holdouts are powerless.' 29 Since they
may be outwitted through exit consents, CACs, enforcement and shar-
ing clauses, 30 there is no substantial risk of holdouts litigating on the
pari passu clause, let alone initiating any other enforcement mecha-
nisms. Is there incentive for holdout creditors to continue to enforce
Elliott-type actions under the pari passu clause? Success in such ac-
tions will produce no benefits. Even if holdout creditors threaten to
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
125. See James Thuo Gathii, The Sanctity of Sovereign Loan Contracts and Its Origins in En-
forcement Litigation, 38 GEo. WASH. INr'L L. REv. 251, 268 (2006); Public Symbol in Private
Contract: A Case Study, supra note 83, at 1639.
126. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 6, at 1093.
127. Hagan, supra note 47, at 317-19.
128. See supra Part IV.
129. See supra Part V.
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use the pari passu clause to recover payments, the sharing clause com-
pels them to share the spoils with all other creditors. The time, effort,
and costs to holdout creditors likely exceed the benefits from such
litigation. Accordingly, the risk of continued interpretive shocks like
Elliott are substantially mitigated, inducing inertia in the drafters of
pari passu clauses to keep the clauses within the confines of market
practice and enable them to enjoy the network benefits.
The exogenous reasons are clearly more convincing than the endog-
enous reasons in justifying status quo to the pari passu clause. This
illustration reemphasizes the principle discussed earlier: in examining
the impact of an interpretive shock on a boilerplate contract term,
both the endogenous and exogenous reasons must be considered. In
this case, the Exogenous Reasoning Proposition carried more support
than the Endogenous Reasoning Proposition. However, other situa-
tions could produce different results depending on the facts and cir-
cumstances of each interpretive shock, its impact on boilerplate
term(s), and other surrounding factors (both endogenous and exoge-
nous). Here, the pari passu clause illustrates the shortcomings of con-
fining studies to empirical work and to endogenous reasoning.
Exogenous reasoning produces different results and plays an impor-
tant role in determining the type of reaction required to neutralize the
interpretive effect.
VI. MONITORING THE FACTORS AFFECTING BOILERPLATE TERMS
From a normative perspective, relying on exogenous factors alone
to examine the language of boilerplate contracts is fraught with risk.
Excessive reliance on exogenous factors is problematic. At a funda-
mental level, exogenous factors that change over time and disturb the
balance between the parties can restore ambiguity to a contract term.
Returning to the pari passu illustration, if over a period of time, sover-
eign bond contracts confer more powers on holdout creditors and re-
verse the current trend, the pari passu debate would regain
prominence. 131 To mitigate such risks, parties ought to continuously
monitor exogenous factors so any changes in those factors modify a
boilerplate contract term or (through any other appropriate mecha-
nism) maintain the status quo. This makes identifying and monitoring
131. In the future, if holdout creditors become capable of initiating individual legal actions,
they are likely to invoke the pari passu clause and its ratable payments interpretation so as to
produce the same result that Elliott generated. This indicates that the pari passu debate has, at
present, only been eclipsed by exogenous factors such as by clipping the powers of the holdout
creditors. The debate has not been obliterated. Therefore, if exogenous factors are reversed, the
pari passu debate is likely to come back into the forefront.
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exogenous factors critical. As one of several methods assisting parties
in identifying and monitoring exogenous factors, empirical studies can
be employed. That holds true for the pari passu clause, where the
combined operation of endogenous and exogenous factors can be
studied empirically. 132
From a monitoring perspective, it is crucial to determine who will
monitor the endogenous and exogenous factors affecting boilerplate
language. Contracting parties themselves do not have the incentives to
monitor and induce change where necessary. Contracting parties are
usually bogged down with network effects, inertia, and collective ac-
tion problems. Furthermore, the cost of monitoring activities is a dis-
incentive to parties. Thus, this role is best carried out by all market
participants whose interests are represented in the aggregate. An as-
sociation of market players usually possesses the necessary specialized
knowledge and skills to monitor changes and determine the need for
altering boilerplate terms. This association may be assisted by advis-
ers, such as law firms, who can assess the circumstances from a legal
standpoint and provide expert input on whether to change boilerplate
terms. Other advisers, such as investment bankers, can comment on
the acceptability of such changes in the marketplace. For instance, in
the derivatives arena, the International Swap and Derivative Associa-
tion (ISDA) carries out that function by drafting the terms for the
ISDA master agreement, which is the boilerplate for derivative con-
tracting, monitoring both endogenous and exogenous factors, and
making periodic amendments to the ISDA master agreement.133 In
the sovereign debt arena, the Emerging Market Traders Association
(EMTA) is the principal trade group for the Emerging Markets trad-
ing and investment community. 134 The EMTA could carry out the
monitoring and standard-setting role in conjunction with other players
in the sovereign debt market, such as multilateral financial
institutions.
132. Such empirical study can focus on the interplay of all the provisions, being the pari passu
clause on the one hand (that is the subject matter of study for this paper) and other clauses such
as CACs, trustee enforcement powers and similar clauses that play on the relationship between
participating creditors and holdout creditors, so as to clearly arrive at an assessment as to how
parties visualize the presence of each of these clauses when they decide whether or not to follow
the boilerplate terms on others.
133. For a discussion on the incentives for such standard setting bodies to track interpretation
of boilerplate contract terms and to ensure proper resolution of any dispute between parties to
such contracts, see Contract as Statute, supra note 25, at 1139; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 27,
at 761-64.
134. For details on EMTA, see EMTA: Trade Association for the Emerging Markets, http://
www.emta.org (last visited October 12, 2008).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Elliott case and subsequent events suggest boilerplate contract
terms may not necessarily change following interpretive shocks even if
such terms are value-reducing in nature due to the learning and net-
work effects of such terms. While endogenous reasons may cause the
constancy of a clause following interpretive shocks, other exogenous
reasons may affect the bargaining power and dynamics between con-
tracting parties. These effects may cause boilerplate terms to continue
unabated, although the terms may be ambiguous in nature due to in-
terpretation handed down by courts.
This article advocates for the review and monitoring of both endog-
enous and exogenous factors that impact any boilerplate term and its
interpretation. Monitoring assists the market in determining whether
boilerplate terms should be left untouched (thereby continuing with
the comfort of the market with such term undisturbed), or if such
terms should be altered to remove ambiguities or enhance the value of
those terms to the parties and the market. For contracts such as sover-
eign debt, which are entered into between sophisticated players, the
monitoring function should be granted to market associations. These
associations maximize the value of contract terms in sovereign debt
documents, thereby enabling the unimpeded flow of transactions in
the sovereign debt market.
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